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I.
On the Role of Probability in Hume’s Imagination and Associationism:
A Bayesian Response to Fodor’s Hume Variations
In his 2003 book Hume Variations, Jerry Fodor attempted to modernize David Hume’s
theory of ideas in an effort to bring the latter into accord with the modern field of cognitive
science; a field which Fodor sees the classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) 1 as
exemplifying. In the work, Fodor contends Hume “was largely right about the architecture of the
cognitive mind” and even goes as far as to proclaim Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature as “the
foundational document of cognitive science,” a document which in Fodor’s view comprised the
first explicit attempt to construct an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational
theory of mind (p. 134). Despite such praise, however, Fodor finds it puzzling Hume’s model of
cognitive architecture, unlike CTM, includes references to the imagination or “fancy,” a fact
Fodor takes to evince a flaw in Hume’s model rather than his own, contending: “We don’t need
imagination because we don’t need association. And we don’t need association because Turing
showed us how to replace it with computation” (Fodor, 2003, p. 115).
According to Fodor, associative relations, unlike the computational relations posited by
CTM, are unable to distinguish merely causal relations amongst thoughts from intentional and
logical relations between the contents of thoughts, e.g., such as distinguishing between a mind
which thinks the thought that P & Q from a mind which thinks the thought that P and is thereby
merely caused to think that Q (p. 115). Fodor believes that Hume, having grasped the above
1

See, e.g., Fodor, (1975); Newell, (1980); Haugeland, (1981). Technically, Fodor advocates the tripartite theory which includes
the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), and the Language of Thought hypothesis
(LOT). I elaborate all three theories in detail in section II. Presently, when I refer to CTM or the Computational Theory of Mind
I am including all three theories unless otherwise specified.
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shortcoming, invoked the extra-associative operations of the imagination as an ad hoc solution.
Thus Fodor, like much of ‘classical’ cognitive science (e.g., Newell, 1980), equates rational
systematic thought as thought, which conforms to the rules of logic—a formal mathematical
theory whose domain concerns inferences between propositions which hold with certainty
(Fodor, 1975; cf. Oaksford and Chater, 2009). Contrary to such a view, however, probabilistic
Bayesian approaches attribute the rationality and systematicity of human thought to our ability to
adaptively reason under conditions of uncertainty—by updating beliefs in response to new
evidence (e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2009; Kruschke, 2008). And while many have noted a
recent “probabilistic turn” in cognitive science (e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2008; Clark, 2012,
2013, 2015; Goodman, et al., 2014), I contend that none, thus far, have fully appreciated just
how much such a turn bespeaks a return to Hume, and towards a more sophisticated
associationism (Kruschke, 2008, Ryder & Favorov, 2001). Fodor, for example, claims “Hume
isn’t really an associationist when push comes to shove, but the price he pays for not being one is
that the architecture of his theory rests on the imagination, and the imagination is a something-Iknow-not-what” (2003, p. 115).
Pace Fodor, in this paper I will argue that Hume’s basing of his cognitive architecture
upon the imagination does not evince a retreat from associationism, but rather shows that
Hume’s associationism is of a more sophisticated form than previously acknowledged, I will
argue that in founding his associationist architecture upon the imagination Hume portended
contemporary Bayesian associationist architectures (e.g., Kruschke, 2008; Clark, 2014). For,
whereas traditional associationist architectures represent knowledge by simple connection
weights (e.g., between the nodes of a neural network) Bayesian associative models represent
knowledge as probability distributions consisting of graded degrees of belief over a range of
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competing hypotheses (Kruschke, 2008). I will argue that this ‘new’ Bayesian associationism
(Ryder & Favorov 2001; Kruschke, 2008, Clark 2014, p. 235), is not in fact new, but amounts to
a formalization of Hume’s augmentation of traditional associationism by the extra-associative
liberty of the imagination. A theoretical move which Fodor finds objectionable, alleging: “all
Hume’s theory tells us about the imagination, narrowly construed, is that it accords with the laws
of association a lot of the time. This doesn’t, however, tell us what happens the rest of the time”
(2003, p. 118; emphasis mine). I propose that the answer to Fodor’s is that the essence of the
“liberty” contributed by the imagination to Hume’s associationism is best described as
randomness, noise, or stochasticity—in other words probability.
If my analysis is on track, Fodor has misconstrued the Humean mind. I will endeavor to
show this is indeed the case by arguing in a key passage cited by Fodor (i.e., THN 1.3.12.22) that
Hume is not concerned with addressing the logical issue of scope relations, as Fodor alleges, but
with the psychological issue of belief revision (cf. Fodor, 2003, p. 114–115). I will argue that
Fodor’s misconstrual results from his attempting to interpret Hume’s fundamentally graded 2 and
probabilistic cognitive architecture in terms of the crisp formal logic required by his commitment
to the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Thus, my engagements with Fodor in the present
paper are mostly negative. However, once I have argued my case for the probabilistic nature of
the Humean mind, I will conclude by suggesting that future work employ the methods of
Bayesian cognitive science to show how the Humean might advance positive solutions to
Fodor’s remaining objections.

2

By “graded” I here and throughout this paper mean to denote representations that come in degrees and are thus scalable rather
than atomic. An example is how probabilities are represented in Bayesian statistics by subjective degrees of belief, which are
assigned a (real numbered) value between 0 and 1, where 1 denotes an outcome which is certain to obtain, and 0 an outcome
which is impossible with all other values encompassing the continuum between certainty and impossibility (or alternately truth
and falsity). Atomic (i.e., ungraded) representations in contrast, only capture the extremes of true and false, i.e., 0 or 1.
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Motivating the Discussion: Hume, Fodor, and the Future of Cognitive Science
Before I begin I should take a moment to situate the current project in the wider debate
and argue for the importance of addressing the specific concerns contained herein. First, though
several authors have been critical of Fodor’s interpretation and attempted appropriation of Hume
(e.g., Biro, 2005; Carruthers, 2005; Sarnecki, 2005; Slezak, 2004), none thus far have attempted
a rigorous defense of the Humean imagination and associationism against Fodor’s specific
charges addressed here nor have any, to my knowledge, offered an empirically plausible
alternative modernization of Hume to that proposed by Fodor in Hume Variations. Quite to the
contrary in fact, as John Biro, though critical of Fodor’s reading of Hume, has nonetheless
argued that Fodor’s RTM is the contemporary model of mind Hume would find most
“congenial” (Biro, 1991, p. 258). As such, Biro’s construal is starkly at odds with the account I
offer here and elsewhere (e.g., Flores, 2015).
Furthermore, while other philosophers have noted correspondences between various
aspects of Hume’s project to the contemporary discipline of cognitive science (e.g., Biro, 1991,
1993; Bower, 1994; Millican, 1998) none, as yet, have drawn detailed parallels between Hume’s
model of cognitive architecture and contemporary probabilistic Bayesian models (though
Hohwy, 2013, does mention Hume briefly). Most germane to the present work, neither have any
theorists to date attempted a probabilistic (specifically Bayesian) elucidation of Hume’s accounts
of mental representation and associationism and as I do here.
Thus, while Fodor and I both believe Hume’s insights may be fruitfully incorporated into
contemporary cognitive science, we differ in our opinion as to which interpretation of cognitive
science best fits Hume. I think probabilistic models (e.g., Clark, 2013, 2015; Kruschke, 2008;
Oaksford and Chater, 2009; Goodman, et al. 2014) are most indicative of Hume, Fodor thinks
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logical models such the classical Computational and Representational Theories of Mind. It could
thus be argued that the present engagement with Hume amounts to little more than a proxy war
between competing contemporary models of cognitive architecture—or worse, reduces to a
superfluous exercise in Whig history. It is thus a fair question then to ask: why bother bringing
Hume into the fray at all? It would be less circuitous simply to debate the merits of the respective
theories directly. To the above I offer the following rejoinders.
First, the most direct route is not necessarily the most illuminating. I argue that
comparing competing theories of cognitive architecture against the familiar backdrop of Hume
brings their contrasts and merits into sharper relief whilst adding historical context. For example,
I contend the present engagement with Hume and Fodor highlights the debate as to whether
human cognition is best construed as fundamentally precise and logical or as inherently uncertain
and probabilistic. These two perspectives happen correspond to Hume’s mutually exclusive
division of the cognitive mind into operations concerning “relations of ideas,” those which yield
apodictic or demonstratively certain conclusions (i.e., such as in mathematics, formal logic, and
geometry), and those applying to “matters of fact,” i.e., the nondemonstrative, abductive, and
inductive reasonings of everyday life whose conclusions are “merely probable” (EHU 4.1-2;
THN 1.3.12.23).3 Fodor’s view exemplifies a model of mind based on the former, Hume and
Bayesian cognitive scientists the latter.
Lastly, I argue the outcome of the current discussion also bears upon more scholarly
considerations, for though Hume continues to be a highly influential and well studied figure
whose ideas remain the source of lively debate, his account of cognitive psychology is widely
3

All citations to Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are abbreviated ‘EHU’ with reference to section and
paragraph supplied by the Beauchamp edition (1998). Citations to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature are abbreviated ‘THN’
with reference to the book, part, section and paragraph supplied by the Norton & Norton edition (2000). References to Hume’s
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals are abbreviated ‘EPM’ with reference to section and paragraph supplied by the
Beauchamp edition (1998).
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assumed to be implausible at best and thoroughly wrong-headed at worst. For instance, no less
than Barry Stroud has asserted:
If we insist on locating Hume’s importance in his naturalistic science of man, it might easily
seem that the importance fades [...] If his contributions are to be judged as part of the
empirical science of man [...] then his ‘results’ will appear ludicrously inadequate, and there
will be no reason to take him seriously. [...] It can easily be felt that the growth in
sophistication complexity, and rigour of the social sciences has left Hume forever behind
(Stroud, 1977, p. 223).

If the contemporary Bayesian probabilistic interpretation of Hume, which I defend in this paper,
is tenable, Stroud, Fodor, and others like them may soon be required to reconsider their opinions.
Should the Bayesian approach to cognitive science prove correct, I contend, contrary to Stroud,
that not only does Hume still have much to offer the current (cognitive) sciences of man, but
most of what he had to say about the mind may have been correct. I begin with an overview of
Fodor’s logical and computational account of the mind in order to contrast it with Hume’s
probabilistic vision.

II.
The Mind According to Fodor
Fodor has described his overall philosophical project as a principled defense of ‘folk
psychology’ also known as propositional attitude4 psychology, or simply, belief/desire
psychology (Fodor, 1983, 1987). The term “folk psychology,” quite simply, refers to our
commonsense intuitions that the best way to predict and account for people’s behavior is to
understand what they believe and what they desire. Fodor’s model of cognitive architecture
consists of three primary components: The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the

4

Propositional attitudes are the thoughts described by such sentence forms as “S believes that P,” “S hopes that P,” “S desires
that P,” etc., where “S” refers to the subject of the attitude, “P” is any sentence, and “that P” refers to the proposition that is the
object of the attitude. If we let “A” stand for such attitude verbs as “believe,” “desire,” “intend,” etc., then the propositional
attitude statements all have the form: S A’s that P (Aydede, 2010).
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Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), and the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOT). RTM
is the claim that mental processes consist of causal sequences of semantically evaluable symbolic
particulars, i.e., mental representations which possess a content which can be regarded as either
true or false (Fodor, 1987 p. 17). CTM adds the additional thesis that propositional attitudes
consist of computational relations to the aforementioned mental representations (Clark, 2014 p.
48).
In order for such a model to be true of human beings, however, requires the existence of
an inner system of symbolic mental representations with a compositional structure, i.e., that the
meaning of complex propositions is a deterministic function of their constituent atomic symbols
and their arrangement. Fodor asserts, this is needed to explain how thought can be both
systematic and productive (Fodor, 2003 p. 135). He calls this hypothetical code, Mentalese or the
Language of Thought (LOT), which he postulates to be an innate human cognitive endowment.
Fodor believes Turing’s theory of computation in conjunction with RTM and the LOT
hypotheses demonstrates how our everyday notions of beliefs and desires can be predictively
potent by showing how the semantic and causal properties of symbols can be captured via purely
syntactic relationships (Fodor, 1987 p. 18). Fodor has summarized the conjunction of the above
view as follows:
What makes mind's rational is their ability to perform computations on thoughts, where
thoughts, like sentences, are assumed to be syntactically structured, and where
“computation” means formal operations in the manner of Turing (Fodor, 1998, p. 205).

Fodor’s account of cognition thus combines Alan Turing’s discovery that the causal properties of
formal systems are determined solely by their syntax with results from the formal logical
discipline of proof theory which have demonstrated that semantic relations, such as truth
conditions, may be perfectly mimicked by (i.e., are isomorphic to) purely syntactic relations
(Fodor, 1987 p. 19). Formal models as outlined above thus demonstrate how semantics may be
9

yoked to syntax, and when combined with Von Neumann’s architecture for a ‘computing
machine’ establishes a means for connecting syntax to causation along with a physical
implementation. Put simply, computers just are environments in which the syntax of a symbol
token determines its causal role in such a way as to respect an assigned semantic content (Fodor,
1987 p. 19). If computational machines are appropriately set up, they will transform one symbol
into another only if its syntactic operations mirror the requisite semantic relations—ideally, the
same relationship which the premises of a valid logical argument bear to its conclusion, which is
why such formal operations are said to be truth-preserving (Fodor, 1987 p. 19). The foregoing
ideas are well captured by John Haugeland’s oft quoted remark “If you take care of the syntax,
the semantics will take care of itself ” (Haugeland, 1981).
A concrete example of the phenomenon described by Haugeland above is how the purely
mechanical (i.e., syntactic) operations of a pocket calculator are deliberately set up to precisely
mirror meaningful arithmetical relationships. Fodor’s CTM and ‘classical’ cognitive science is
thus predicated on the assumption that our minds function in much the same manner as a
calculator, but on a much grander scale (Fodor, 1987, p. 19). Hence, as Fodor himself has stated:
‘classical’ cognitive science may be rightfully described as “an extended attempt to apply the
methods of proof theory to the modeling of thought” (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, pp. 29–30) .
It is not hard to appreciate the appeal of the above Turing machine conception of the
mind. If such a view is correct then accounting for mental causation and the productivity,
compositionality, and systematicity of thought can be explained as a straightforward matter of
deductive inference—as Turing machines are logical symbol manipulators par excellence (2003,
p. 135). Inferring Q from, P & (P → Q) for such a device is a simple matter of modus ponens: a
simple derivation easily physically implemented with basic logic-gates. Fodor argues, therefore,
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that we should abandon Hume’s inchoate imagination-based associative cognitive architecture in
favor of a better understood mental architecture based on the digital computer (Fodor, 2003, p.
131).
In Fodor’s view, the above RTM/CTM/LOT model of cognition has obviated the
theoretical pressures which motivated Hume to invoke a dedicated faculty of the imagination.
Fodor contends since syntactic computation a la Turing is capable of explaining everything the
imagination can about how the mind’s prior experiences affect its current operations, a separate
faculty of imagination becomes otiose (2003, p. 130). He thus charges, “We don’t need
imagination because we don’t need association. And we don’t need association because Turing
showed us how to replace it with computation” (p. 115).

Problems with the Computational Theory of Mind
Contrary to Fodor, however, I believe abandoning the imagination in favor of CTM is the
wrong move, for as Fodor himself is increasingly beginning to note (e.g., Fodor, 2008), the
Turing machine model of the mind is increasingly plagued by conceptual problems suggesting, at
best, it is only likely to account for a limited portion of cognitive capacities. While Turing
machines excel at operations based on deduction (something difficult for humans) they are
woefully inept when it comes to abduction: inference to the best (or likely) explanation based on
noisy or incomplete data, something human beings naturally excel at. Furthermore, the problem
of locality vs. globality captures the apparent fact that the majority of adaptive human
intelligence—such as belief formation and hypothesis testing—consists of non-deductive
rationality dependent on global features of the entire cognitive system, which as such do not
appear to be based on syntactic operations in the Turing sense. While Hume was unable to
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explain the mechanisms behind the mind’s ability to reason using global inferences, it is clear
that he was aware that such inferences were commonplace. Instructively Hume attributed global
inferences to the imagination:
Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its
ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The
fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong
to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected
to our view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper for our purpose
(THN 1.1.7.15; italics mine).

Contrast the above with the Turing machine notion of computation upon which Fodor’s CTM
hinges, which consists of ‘local’ operations upon mental representations in virtue of their logical
form, or more simply put, upon the local relations between a complex symbol and its
constituents. An example: the inference from (P & Q) to P, depends purely on the relation
between the complex symbol (P & Q) and its constituent P. In Fodor’s CTM this is interpreted as
involving operations over complex mental representations, qua sentences in Mentalese encoding
the requisite logical forms. However, properties like simplicity, relevance, or explanatory
optimality, which appear to guide and constrain human nondemonstrative cognition don’t appear
to be at all syntactic in the above sense, but rather seem to depend upon global properties of the
entire cognitive system, or as Fodor puts it:
[W]hat’s the best of the available explanations depends on what alternative explanations are
available; and, by definition, the presence or absence of alternatives to a hypothesis isn’t a
local property of that hypothesis (2008, p. 121).

Simply stated: nothing about a belief qua complex symbol such as (P & Q) and its constituents
determines how much endorsing that belief should affect one’s total set of cognitive
commitments (Fodor, 2008, p. 121). Or as Fodor rightly puts it “the truth of P & Q is (roughly) a
function of the truth of P and the truth of Q; but the consistency of P & Q” isn’t merely as
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function of the consistency of P and the consistency of Q, but rather depends on the global
consistency of one’s total set of beliefs (Fodor, 2008, p. 121; footnote 33).
Despite such misgivings however, Fodor still cleaves to CTM arguing that while the
leading alternative associationist cognitive architectures (i.e., connectionist machines) fare well
at induction (i.e., generalizing from experience), such models do no better at abduction. Pace
Fodor, classical connectionism is not the only viable alternative to CTM, though I do not have
the space to adequately discuss all of the relevant details here, probabilistic Bayesian models of
cognitive architecture are beginning to tackle the problems of abduction and globality which
have stymied logic based approaches such as CTM (for an overview see: Shi & Griffiths, 2009;
Clark, 2014, p. 49, 2002; Bonawitz, et al., 2011). Thus as even Fodor is becoming increasingly
skeptical that the RTM/CTM/LOT model can ever claim to be a general account of cognition
(Fodor, 2008, p. 101), many cognitive scientists are beginning to turn away from logic, the
calculus of certainty, towards probability: the calculus of uncertainty. I argue that this
probabilistic turn in cognitive science comprises a return to Hume. To make this case I will begin
by illustrating graded and probabilistic nature of Hume’s cognitive architecture and show how
the tools of Bayesian cognitive modeling provide an apt means of formalizing his prescient but
informal insights.

III.
Hume in the Light of Bayesian Cognitive Science
“[A]ll knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature
with that evidence, which we employ in common life” —(THN 1.4.1.4).
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Many scholars have noted a similarity between ideas originating in the work of Thomas Bayes
(1970) and those of Hume (e.g., Poitras, 2013; Gower, 1990; Owen, 1987). However, the bulk of
the literature on Hume and Bayesian probability, which remains controversial, concerns not
Hume’s theory of ideas or cognitive architecture, but instead is almost entirely concerned with
Hume’s arguments against human testimony as evidence for the existence of miracles and
similar critiques of religion (EHU 10.1; Dawid & Gillies, 1989; Gower, 1990; Owen, 1987; W.
Salmon, 1978; Poitras, 2013). A few exceptions are Raynor (1980), who presented evidence that
Hume was at least cursorily aware of Bayes’ theorem by 1767 (long after Hume composed the
works which I here examine), and Gower (1990) who argued that Hume’s probability of causes
is non-Bayesian in character. However, I consider Gower’s arguments to have been soundly
refuted by Mura (1998) who has shown Hume’s ideas on probability, suitably formalized,
comprise a sound system of inductive logic, which is resolutely Bayesian. Space considerations
do not permit me to engage the above topics, and moreover, my purpose is largely orthogonal to
such debates, being to demonstrate the consilience that results from a Bayesian elaboration of
Hume’s account of belief, associationism, and the imagination.
My current use of the adjective “Bayesian” in describing Hume should thus not be
interpreted too broadly, when using the term I will attempt to be clear as to what property I
intend it to denote. Presently, I mean no more than to signify that Hume construed probability as
subjective degrees of belief, a conclusion reached by many beside myself (e.g., Mura, 1998;
Pearl, 1988 p. 29; Hájek & Hall, 2002). Additionally, however, I will argue that for Hume
desires, hopes, and other propositional attitudes (e.g., THN 2.3.9.6) were likewise similarly
graded. In fact, it is my strong contention that Hume conceived of mental representations
generally as being both graded and probabilistic (THN 1.4.1.4-5). I suggest this conclusion,
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which some might find controversial, in fact requires little or no exegesis. Hume explicitly and
iteratively states that beliefs and desires (e.g., THN 1.3.12.17, and 1.3.12.24, respectively) come
in degrees, and that impressions and ideas form a graded continuum (EHU 2.3; THN 2.1.11.7),
and that the degree of assent which we grant to any of the above continua is distinguished solely
in terms of their relative degrees of force and vivacity (THN 1.3.10.3). However, if impressions
and ideas are graded and the force and vivacity by which the two are distinguished is graded as
well, then a fortiori—all mental representations are graded, because for Hume there is nothing
other than impressions and ideas.
I will endeavor to show that a Bayesian formalization of Hume’s associationist
architecture straightforwardly follows from the above premise, a premise for which I will
provide a more detailed argument for in a moment. Before I begin however, it is important I
briefly take a moment to forestall some tempting misunderstandings as to the nature of my
endeavor. First, at no point am I suggesting that there was any direct influence of the work of the
Reverend Thomas Bayes on Hume, and—it should be superfluous to emphasize—neither am I
implying that Hume thought of what he was doing as “Bayesian” or a having anything to do with
Bayes himself or the latter’s ideas on probability. Also, the term “Bayesian” refers to the modern
field of Bayesian statistical inference as applied to cognitive science, none of which was
developed by Thomas Bayes who merely derived the primary theorem which bares his name.
Thus, there is in fact very little of the Reverend Bayes’ ideas in contemporary Bayesianism.
Second, throughout my exposition I will draw together many discontiguous examples
From Hume’s writings, a strategy which may strike some as procrustean or gerrymandered.
However, I argue that while many of my quotations are indeed pulled from their original
contexts, I argue that Hume’s view of the mind was unified, and proceeded along the assumption
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“It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again,
may be resolved into one more general and universal” and he applied the same overarching
paradigm to all of his inquiries (EHU 1.15). It is this larger paradigm which I here aim to
capture, thus the model of cognitive science here developed should be understood as “Humean”
rather than strictly Hume’s. Caveats aside, however, it is my claim that the view of the mind I
will attempt to formalize and elucidate is indeed Hume’s, beginning with his view of the mind as
inherently probabilistic.

Hume’s Subjective Interpretation of Probability
Why I am attributing a specifically Bayesian model of cognitive architecture to Hume
rather than a probabilistic model more generally? My reason for this is that the particular version
of probabilistic cognitive science, which I believe to be most indicative of Hume’s own approach
to cognitive psychology, centers upon a specific interpretation of probability and not merely on
the mathematics of probability itself. The Bayesian cognitive science to which I subscribe
approaches probability theory not as a formalism for capturing objective facts in the world (e.g.,
such as outcomes of tosses of dice), but as an optimal calculus for rationally updating one’s
beliefs about such events (Oaksford & Chater, 2009). Such a view is known as a subjectivist
interpretation of probability.
Bruno de Finetti, one of the founders of modern Bayesian statistics, began his treatise The
Theory of Probability (1974) with the bold statement: “Probability does not exist” (p. x).
However, de Finetti was not the first to deny the existence of probability as an objective feature
of the world, and was preceded in his view by others, notably Hume, who asserted:
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“Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of
any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or
opinion” (EHU 6.1).

What de Finetti and Hume meant was that probability does not exist objectively— independent
from human psychology—but only subjectively, as a measure of an agent’s degree of belief in
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a particular event (Nau, 2001, p. 90). Or as Hume put the
matter: “what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and concealed cause” (THN
1.3.12.1). I suggest an illuminating way of characterizing Hume’s particular subjectivist
interpretation of probability is as the view that beliefs are graded in order to account for
uncertainty (cf. Goodman, et al, 2014).
In Hume’s words: “uncertainty is derived from a concealed contrariety of causes” (THN
1.3.12.21). Thus for Hume like contemporary Bayesians, probability, qua degrees of belief, is a
subjective measure of our ignorance and uncertainty regarding the hidden causes of our
observations. I take the following passages as sufficient to establish this conclusion:
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and
according as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability
receives a proportionable increase, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that
side, in which we discover the superiority (EHU 6.2; italics mine).

And in the Treatise:
The belief, which attends the probability, is a compounded effect, and is formed by the
concurrence of the several effects, which proceed from each part of the probability. Since
therefore each part of the probability contributes to the production of the belief, each part of
the possibility must have the same influence on the opposite side; the nature of these parts
being entirely the same. The contrary belief, attending the possibility, implies a view of a
certain object, as well as the probability does an opposite view. In this particular both these
degrees of belief are alike. The only manner then, in which the superior number of similar
component parts in the one can exert its influence, and prevail above the inferior in the
other, is by producing a stronger and more lively view of its object (THN 1.3.12.17; italics
mine).
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I here contend that we may perceive a defining difference between Hume and Fodor’s respective
theories of mind: for Fodor the mental representations which comprise the contents of beliefs are
atomic, language-like, and propositional, whereas for Hume propositional attitudes are inherently
probabilistic and graded. In fact, as I argued at the beginning of this section, for Hume all
mental representations and knowledge states are graded and probabilistic, thus inherently encode
uncertainty (THN 1.4.1.4-5).
Evidence that Hume’s Representational Theory of Mind is Inherently Probabilistic.
Consider Hume’s graded distinction between impressions and ideas. Recall, that
according to Hume “All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct
kinds,” which he denominates impressions and ideas distinguished solely by their differing
degrees of force and vivacity (THN 1.1.1.1). Impressions are “the more forceful perceptions”
which occur, such as when information is registered directly from the senses, whereas ideas are:
“the faint images of sensory impressions in thinking and reasoning” (THN 1.1.1). Thus for
Hume, both beliefs and impressions are graded and distinguished from suppositions and ideas,
respectively, solely by their greater degrees of force and vivacity, which I discuss in a moment.
In addition to the foregoing distinctions, however, I argue Hume also explicitly advanced a
graded theory of desires:
I say, it is evident, that the passion, properly speaking, is not a simple emotion, but a
compounded one, of a great number of weaker passions, derived from a view of each part of
the object. For otherwise it were impossible the passion should increase by the increase of
these parts. Thus a man, who desires a thousand pound, has in reality a thousand or more
desires which uniting together, seem to make only one passion (THN 1.3.12.24; emphasis
mine).

Furthermore, I contend that Hume appears to hold a graded view of propositional attitudes
generally, and applies the above probabilistic framework to passions such as hope, grief, and
fear. He writes: “When good is certain or probable, it produces joy [...] When either good or evil
18

is uncertain, it gives rise to fear or hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side
or the other” (THN 2.3.9.6; italics mine). Thus it is evident that for Hume the mental
representations that comprise the contents of propositional attitudes are graded in order to
account for probabilistic degrees of belief and uncertainty. In fact, a better gloss on Hume’s
account might be to describe intentional states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears as
probabilistic attitudes (Aydede, 2005). I thus allege Hume not only posited degrees of belief, but
also degrees of grief, and quantified both in terms of their relative uncertainty.
A more compressed argument for my above contention that Hume developed a
probabilistic approach to propositional attitude psychology goes as follows: Hume stated: “By
knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas” and “By probability,
that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty” (THN 1.3.11.2; italics mine). However,
Hume ultimately concludes that because of unavoidable uncertainties “all knowledge resolves
itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which we
employ in common life” (THN 1.4.1.4; emphasis mine). Hence, I argue that the Humean mind is
fundamentally a probabilistic mind. And as we have seen above, Hume’s view of probability was
qualitative and subjectivist—specifically the ‘modern’ Bayesian view of probability as a measure
one’s subjective degrees of belief. It is in the foregoing respect, therefore, that I conclude that
Hume’s account of mental architecture is resolutely Bayesian. I will now show how the above
aspects of Hume’s theory cognitive architecture are easily captured via the mathematical concept
of a probability distribution, which I further show is able to formalize Hume’s notions of force
and vivacity. I then proceed to consider how such relates to our engagement with Fodor.
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Humean Mental Representations as Probability Distributions
The advantage of Hume’s probabilistic approach to propositional attitude psychology is
whereas classical computational models, such as Fodor’s, have no obvious way of explaining an
agent’s uncertainty; Hume’s account represents it inherently. In Bayesian cognitive science such
mental representations may be formalized as probability distributions (Kruschke, 2008). I will
use one of Hume’s own examples to illustrate this concept. In the following passage Hume was
concerned with the question of how “a superior number of equal chances operates upon the
mind, and produces belief or assent” (THN 1.3.11.8):
[W]e shall suppose a person to take a dye, formed after such a manner as that four of its
sides are marked with one figure, or one number of spots, and two with another; and to put
this dye into the box with an intention of throwing it: It is plain, he must conclude the one
figure to be more probable than the other, and give the preference to that which is inscribed
on the greatest number of sides. He in a manner believes, that this will lie uppermost; though
still with hesitation and doubt, in proportion to the number of chances, which are contrary:
And according as these contrary chances diminish, and the superiority increases on the other
side, his belief acquires new degrees of stability and assurance (THN 1.3.11. 9; emphasis
mine).

Take the above six-sided die to have a circle inscribed on two sides and a triangle on the
remaining four. Say your friend shakes such a box and turns it upside down on the table, note at
this point it is fully determined (i.e., by ‘hidden causes’), hence an objective fact, which side in
fact lies uppermost. However, even before we observe the outcome (the hidden variable) we can
nonetheless report how much we believe whether a circle or triangle lies uppermost, we might
even bet money on the outcome. Probability, thus construed, measures our prior degree of
belief—our bet—that a particular side has come up before observing the actual outcome.
Judgments regarding prior probabilities may be understood as conjectures or hypotheses based
on our assumptions and accumulated working knowledge. Instructively, Hume referred to
probability as “reasoning by conjecture” (THN 1.3.11.3).
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In Hume’s example above, since the same figure (i.e., triangle) is inscribed on two faces
and another (i.e., circle) on the remaining four, thus (assuming a fair die) the objective odds of
the uppermost figure being a triangle are

2
6

1

= 3, and

4
6

=

2
3

of being a circle. Since the odds are

greater for a circle most people—based on symmetry, knowledge, or intuition—will believe most
strongly (and if forced to would bet more money) that a circle is most likely to be on top. Hume
put the process as follows:
Four sides are supposed in the present case to have the same figure inscribed on them, and
two to have another figure. The impulses of the former are, therefore, superior to those of
the latter. But as the events are contrary, and it is impossible both these figures can be turned
up; the impulses likewise become contrary, and the inferior destroys the superior, as far as
its strength goes. The vivacity of the idea is always proportionable to the degrees of the
impulse or tendency to the transition; and belief is the same with the vivacity of the idea,
according to the precedent doctrine (THN 1.3.11.13).

Thus for Hume, probability in the above example quantifies one’s degree of belief in the
likelihood of an as yet unobserved outcome, however, say we are judging not one but several
events? Take the familiar example of the Galton Box below (fig. 1).

(fig. 1). The Galton Box5

5

Image credit: http://www.alanzucconi.com/2015/09/09/understanding-the-gaussian-distribution/
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Now, Imagine your friend has dropped a coin into the Galton box, before even looking at the
outcome, you can probably report how much you believe that the coin has landed in each
possible bin. If you have experience with such a device you will expect the familiar hump shape
to eventually emerge in the bins and predict that any given coin is more likely to fall in the center
column at first and then is only later likely to trickle into one of the side-most bins (Goodman &
Tenenbaum, 2015). Your idea of this shape may thus be considered to represent your belief in a
particular expected outcome over many trials of the above experiment, formalized
mathematically this shape is known as a probability distribution: one of the basic concepts
essential to statistical inference. The above concept of a probability distribution can thus be seen
to formalize Hume’s notion that a belief “is to be considered as a compounded effect, of which
each part arises from a proportionable number of chances or experiments” (THN 1.3.12.16).
Beliefs, and their contents6 in this view then are probability distributions, but of what?
Possible worlds. In the context of Bayesian cognitive science, beliefs are often construed
as probability distributions over some unknown state of the world. In more philosophical terms
we may say a belief consists of a probability distribution over possible worlds, e.g., such as a
single compound judgment representing our belief in the proportion of possible worlds in which
the die comes up circle to the total number of possible worlds in which the die is rolled. Though
one may think the notion of a possible world too modern or recondite for Hume, I argue the

6

The propositional attitude of belief on my reading, then consists of an idea which has as its content (or in modern
terms its intentional object) an impression, whether an impression of sense, memory, or reflection. Alternately the
content may be an idea related to a present impression. Hume writes: “I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more
vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain… it
is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and
in their feeling to the mind (EHU 5.10; italics mine). Elsewhere he states: “belief is nothing but a strong and lively
idea derived from a present impression related to it (THN 1.3.8.11). thus a belief is an idea with another idea for its
content. I here am arguing that both beliefs and their contents consist of probability distributions, this requires then
that all perceptions (impressions and ideas) are probabilistic.
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contrary, and suggest that save for the modern formalisms, Hume conceived of beliefs in very
much the same manner, consider the following passage:
To every probability there is an opposite possibility. This possibility is composed of parts,
that are entirely of the same nature with those of the probability; and consequently have the
same influence on the mind and understanding. The belief, which attends the probability, is
a compounded effect, and is formed by the concurrence of the several effects, which proceed
from each part of the probability. Since therefore each part of the probability contributes to
the production of the belief, each part of the possibility must have the same influence …
(THN 1.3.12.17; emphasis mine).

Thus, I contend it is no great leap to attribute to Hume the above view that beliefs are comprised
of mental representations consisting of probability distributions over possible worlds. Otherwise
how else could he have conceived possibilities as being composed of parts, each of which is
assigned a corresponding to a degree of belief? Thus for Hume (so I argue), a propositional
attitude represents one’s degree of assent (as a probability distribution) towards a mentally
represented set of possible states of affairs (also a probability distribution). I believe this
proposed formalization makes precise Hume’s notion of a belief as a particular manner of
conceiving an idea (EHU 5.10). In the view I have here advances a belief (or other propositional
attitude) is a higher-order mental phenomena. I will now contend the foregoing idea of a higherorder mental state may be employed to formalize Hume’s notion of force and vivacity.
Force and vivacity as verisimilitude: perceiving is believing. There is a fair amount of
scholarly controversy about how to interpret Hume’s talk of force and vivacity (cf. Seppalainen
& Coventry, 2012; Dauer, 1999; Waxman, 1993; Wild, 2011). Much of the debate concerns
whether to interpret force and vivacity phenomenologically, i.e., how it feels or seems or
functionally, i.e., how it behaves in our minds. While I believe there often is a phenomenological
aspect to vivacity (we can usually know via introspection whether we are perceiving or
imagining a state of affairs, or believe in x as opposed to merely suppose that x), I favor the
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particular functional interpretation offered by Wayne Waxman, whose interpretation I believe
naturally accords with the account found in Bayesian cognitive science. Waxman argues Hume’s
notion force and vivacity is best summarized as verisimilitude, i.e., “truthlikeness” (Waxman,
1993). By “verisimilitude” is meant precisely what Hume states below:
[T]hat act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us
than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence
on the passions and imagination (THN 1.3.7.7).

Thus vivacity is that factor which makes the difference to us between what is taken for (or acted
upon as) reality or truth, and what is not (note that this is a psychological claim and not a
metaphysical one). Thus we feel and behave very differently when we sincerely believe our
house is on fire than when we merely imagine or suppose it to be aflame. Thus belief, qua the
communication of vivacity as verisimilitude has the capacity to:
[R]aise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like
influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an
impression in force and vivacity. For as the different degrees of force make all the original
difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the source of all
the differences in the effects of these perceptions (THN 1.3.10.3; emphasis mine).

As Waxman notes, vivacity as outlined in the quote above, functions as an “independent
variable” which can completely transform an idea into an impression (e.g., as in madness or
sympathy) or weaken a sensation to the point of actually becoming an idea, as in those situations
when an impression is so faint that we cannot distinguish it from an idea (Waxman, 1993, p. 78).
I will now show how the graded probabilistic account of cognitive architecture thus elaborated
allows us to understand Hume’s model of the mind via analogy with contemporary associative
architectures which have been converted into Bayesian models.
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IV.
Hume’s ‘Bayesian’ Associationism
Kruschke in a recent paper (2008) has suggested that most deterministic models of associative
learning can be easily converted into probabilistic Bayesian models with two basic
modifications. Kruschke uses these modifications to show how the Kalman filter may be
understood as a “Bayesification” of the traditional Rescorla–Wagner model of associative
learning (Kruschke, 2008, p. 224). I now argue that Kruschke’s interpretation may likewise
illuminate Hume’s systematic augmentation of traditional associationism.
The first step in converting a traditional model into a Bayesian model, according to
Kruschke, requires making the outcome activations probabilistic rather than deterministic. The
simplest solution to this step is to take the original deterministic process and inject noise or
randomness at a clearly defined point in the processing chain (Goodman, et al., 2014, p. 4). The
result is a then stochastic process which unfolds just like original process, except at those points
where a random choice is made (ibid.).
The second step necessary for converting a traditional associative model to a Bayesian
one is ensuring the entire hypothesis space of associative weight combinations is simultaneously
represented by a degree of belief for each possible combination (i.e., setting the prior
distribution). This is for the reason that in Bayesian models agents are assumed to
simultaneously entertain multiple candidate hypotheses with differing degrees of plausibility
(Kruschke, 2008). Hence, for any moment in time t the agent will believe most strongly in some
particular hypothesis, somewhat in others, and even less strongly in the remaining ones
(Kruschke, 2008, p. 211). In Kruschke’s example using the Kalman filter, the above step was
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accomplished by assuming a normally distributed prior. How might the above modifications
relate to Hume?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, we now decide to apply the above Bayesian
modifications to Hume’s particular associationism. If we attempt to do so, however, I contend
that what we shall discover is that Hume has already implemented the requisite modifications. If
this is correct, therefore, I argue that it is both appropriate and no great leap to interpret Hume’s
associationism as effectively comprising a “Bayesification” of traditional associationism, thus
opening the door to understanding Hume’s project of a science of human nature in Bayesian
terms. To further my argument, allow me to briefly review Hume’s associationism.
Hume’s Principles of the Association of Ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and
effect, purport to capture the regularities by which the imagination recombines simple ideas into
complex ideas (THN 1.1.4.1). Hume strongly emphasizes however, that the above principles of
association are only “a gentle force which commonly prevails” and we are not to conclude that
“without [the principles of association] the mind cannot join two ideas as the fables we meet with
in poems and romances put this entirely out of question” (THN 1.1.1.58). To account for the
foregoing exception, Hume invokes a “second principle” that of “the liberty of the imagination to
transpose and change its ideas” (ibid.). Hume often refers to this more unconstrained aspect of
the imagination as “the fancy” whose only constraint is that it cannot form images bearing
genuinely contradictory properties—such as of a triangle whose third side is longer than the sum
of the two remaining sides (EHU 2.4). Now consider Hume’s preceding account of “the fancy”
to the first step in the Bayesian modifications discussed above, i.e., the injection of noise or
randomness. I contend that they are in effect the same. In fact, Hume explicitly acknowledged
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the presence of chance and randomness in his associationism in several places in both the
Treatise and Enquiry, moreover, Hume again attributes this indeterminism to the imagination:
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in
what form it pleases, nothing would be more unaccountable than the operations of that
faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some
measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and
unconnected, chance alone would join them (THN 1.1.4.1).

Hume above clearly states that it is not merely “chance alone” which joins ideas in the
imagination, but also the regular workings of the principles of association, however, this entails
that chance also is a factor in the workings of the imagination. Additionally, in the Enquiry
Hume also describes what (I contend) we would today characterize as noise or stochasticity in
the otherwise regular workings of the association of ideas, for example:
Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of ideas; and where you destroy
these ties, however other accidents may bring two ideas together… (THN 2.2.8.13).

And:
When a sword is leveled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more
strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this idea
should occur after the appearance of the latter object (EHU 5.20)?

I strongly contend that passages such as the above clearly evince Hume’s supplementation of his
otherwise regular (i.e., deterministic) principles association with occasional random variations,
noise, or “accidents.” Moreover, I suggest that much if not all of the “liberty of the imagination
to transpose and change its ideas” just is due to the contributions of random noise (THN 1.1.3.4).
In fact, Hume elsewhere states that “liberty and chance are synonymous” (THN ), even going as
far as to explicitly define “liberty” as the very same thing as chance7. Lastly, I contend that for
Hume to state that the principles of association are only “a gentle force, which commonly
prevails,” and thus are not fully deterministic simply is to state that workings of association are
7

I.e., “According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by
removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance” (THN 2.3.1.18; emphasis mine).
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ipso facto probabilistic. As a matter of record, I am not the first scholar to highlight the
probabilistic character of Hume’s principles of association, in fact John Bricke (1974) made
much the same point decades ago. I thus conclude Hume’s associationism clearly accords with
our first Bayesian criteria above. What then of the second criteria?
The simplest strategy for implementing the second criteria above (setting a prior
distribution of beliefs over one’s total hypothesis space) would be to adopt what is known as the
principle of indifference by assigning equal probabilities to every possible outcome resulting in
what is (somewhat misleadingly) known as a non-informative prior. Here again I argue that
Hume again has preceded the contemporary Bayesian view, as he clearly describes how the
imagination, when faced with uncertain odds, proceeds by assuming the principle of indifference
(cf. Mura, 1998, p. 315-316).
Where nothing limits the chances, every notion, that the most extravagant fancy can form,
is upon a footing of equality; nor can there be any circumstance to give one the advantage
above another. Thus unless we allow, that there are some causes to make the dice fall, and
preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their sides, we can form no
calculation concerning the laws of hazard (THN 1.3.11.6; emphasis mine).

Hume even references the principle of indifference directly:
A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total indifference can never
in itself be either superior or inferior to another. This truth is not peculiar to my system, but
is acknowledged by every one, that forms calculations concerning chances (THN 1.3.11.5).

Thus, in response to Fodor’s claim “Hume has no story at all about what the laws are that govern
these nonassociative operations of the imagination” (p. 117). I respond that Hume’s
associationism is aptly construed as a probabilistic Bayes-enhanced version of traditional
associationism. I argue that once this is appreciated it can be seen, contrary to Fodor, that rather
than being an ad hoc means of addressing logical issue of scope relations, the primary purview
of Hume’s imagination concerns the psychological issues of probabilistic belief revision. Hence,
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contrary to Fodor, if my above arguments are correct then Humean view of the mind is more
akin to a slot machine than a Turing machine.

V.
Fodor’s Misconstrual of the Humean Imagination
The imagination has been described as the “supreme Humean faculty” (Streminger, 1980, p. 91;
Salmon, 1929, p. 336). As E.J. Furlong and Norman Kemp Smith have both noted, the Humean
imagination is not merely a faculty of feigning, whimsy, and error, but a rational faculty, which
operates in tandem with the communication of “vivacity” in order to produce beliefs—including
perceptual beliefs, beliefs of memory, as well as beliefs reached by the understanding; the faculty
of the mind which reasons (Furlong, 1961, p. 64). Thus as Furlong has aptly observed: “Where
an intellectualist solves problems by recourse to reason or intellect Hume’s universal remedy
appears to be imagination” (Furlong, 1961, p. 63). A statement attested to by Hume’s assertion
“The memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination,
or the vivacity of our ideas” (THN 1.4.7.3). However, if the account I have argued for in the
preceding sections is correct, the imagination’s role in cognition is best understood in terms of
Bayesian inference, and thus belief revision.
I contend therefore, that Fodor’s critique of Hume’s associationism and imagination is
largely based on a misconstrual of the following passage (excerpted by Fodor, 2003, p. 115)
from Hume’s chapter Of the Probability of Causes. I suggest that Fodor has erred by
misinterpreting Hume’s fundamentally graded and probabilistic account in terms of the crisp
formal logic required by the classical Computational Theory of Mind. Fodor puts forward the
following passage as evidence for his claims:
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When we transfer contrary experiments to the future, we can only repeat these contrary
experiments with their particular proportions; which could not produce assurance in any
single event, upon which we reason, unless the fancy melted together all those images that
concur, and extracted from them one single idea or image, which is intense and lively in
proportion to the number of experiments from which it is derived, and their superiority
above their antagonists. Our past experience presents no determinate object; and as our
belief, however faint, fixes itself on a determinate object, it is evident that the belief arises
not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy
conjoined with it. This may lead us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into
all our reasonings (THN 1.3.12.22; emphasis mine).

Fodor, however, interprets the above passage as comprising an “elegant example” of Hume’s
apprehension of the need to distinguish merely associative relations among mental states from
logical relations among their intentional objects, “But since association provides no way to do
so,” says Fodor, the Humean “imagination must come to the rescue” (2003, p. 115).
Pace Fodor, instead of reading Hume above as invoking the imagination to solve a
strictly logical problem, I argue that we should take the passage at face value—as concerning
probabilistic prediction and belief revision. I argue the passage clearly describes (i.e., “when we
transfer the past to the future…”) prediction as a process of belief revision in the imagination
(“the belief arises […] from some operation of the fancy”). A process, which, I contend, is best,
described as the synthesis of a probability distribution, i.e., “a single idea,” over graded degrees
of belief (THN, 1.3.12.22)? Perhaps, as argued by Oaksford and Chater (2009), human
rationality, hence the systematicity and productivity of human thought, is best accounted for not
by logic and proof theory, but again by probability. I contend that Fodor has surreptitiously
inserted cognitivist assumptions into his critique, namely, the assumption that thinking consists
of formal logical operations over complex symbols.
I argue the correct reading of the above passage instead requires the recognition that
Hume understood cognition as a probabilistic rather than logical process. I contend Hume
advocates something quite the opposite of Fodor: that everyday reasoning is expressly not the
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function of the understanding, i.e., the part of us that reasons logically, but of imagination. To
this Fodor is likely to object that Hume’s “imagination is a blank check” or that “Hume has no
story at all about what the laws are that govern these nonassociative operations of the
imagination (2003, p. 117). But as I have already argued, the nonassociative operations of the
imagination may be accounted for as the contributions of randomness and uncertainty. But what
of the remaining operations of the fancy—those which may account for the systematicity of
thought and rational belief revision?
I argue that answer may be found in the very passage cited by Fodor wherein explicitly
states that the mechanism whereby the imagination enters into all of our reasonings (suitably
formalized) is belief revision via the synthesis (or sampling) of posterior predictive distributions,
i.e., the distribution of unobserved observations (i.e., future predictions) conditional on
previously observed data. I.e., in Hume’s argot: “melting together” images which concur and
extracting from them a single idea or image “lively in proportion to the number of experiments
from which it is derived” (THN, 1.3.12.22). Hume uses the example of the predicted likelihood
of the outcome of a future (unobserved) experiment (i.e., toss of a die), conditional on past
assumptions and experiments (observed tosses and the assumption that each side of a 6 sided die
is equally likely to come up) (THN 1.3.11.9). I contend this reading is supported by the many
places where Hume explicitly describes the predictive, future-oriented, nature of the imagination,
e.g., when “the fancy remains fixed, and from the present instant surveys the future and the past”
(THN 2.3.7.9), and his assertion: “The fancy anticipates the course of things, and surveys the
object in that condition, to which it tends, as well as in that, which is regarded as the present”
(THN 2.3.7.9).
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In Bayesian cognitive models a posterior predictive distribution may be used to formally
represent Hume’s notion of “a single idea or image [of a future event], which is intense and
lively in proportion (i.e., conditioned upon) the number of experiments from which it is derived”
(e.g., THN 1.3.12.12; cf. Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014, p. 45). Hume asserts “our belief, however
faint, fixes itself on a determinate object.” I claim this “determinate object” of which Hume
speaks is, in Bayesian terms, a posterior predictive distribution. Hence the passage, which Fodor
interprets as concerned with addressing a logical issue, in fact has Hume offering an apt—yet
informal—description of the imagination’s role in probabilistic belief revision. I thus conclude
that Fodor has misconstrued the Humean imagination, and thus the more appropriate formal
analysis of Hume’s cognitive architecture requires the methods of (Bayesian) probability rather
than formal logic and proof theory.

VI.
Conclusion:
I have thus argued that Hume’s model of the mind is inherently probabilistic. I contend
that for Hume all mental representations, including impressions, ideas, beliefs, and desires are
graded in order to account for uncertainty. I have further alleged that the “liberty” by which the
Humean imagination transcends the principles of the association of ideas is the liberty of chance,
noise, or randomness. I have also demonstrated that the result of Hume’s modification results in
a resolutely Bayesian form of associationism. Lastly, I have contended that the above reading
suggests that Fodor has misconstrued Hume’s cognitive architecture by attempting to interpret
what is inherently probabilistic in terms of the crisp formal logic required by his commitment to
the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). If the Humean mind—and indeed the human mind—
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traffics in probability distributions rather than Fodor’s symbols of Mentalese, a proper account of
cognition will likely require the tools of probability rather than logic.
It is thus my belief that the formal methods of Bayesian cognitive science discussed in
this paper provide the computational tools with which to formalize, unify, and further elucidate
many of Hume’s original insights, and perhaps, to even continue his goal of constructing a
unified cognitive science of human nature. If the account which I have developed in this paper is
plausible, Hume’s probabilistic approach to propositional attitude psychology was radically
ahead of his time, and the current probabilistic turn in cognitive science should be
acknowledged, at least in part, to comprise return to Hume.

VII.
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